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Abstract 
 
This paper examines some competing views on currency regime choice by applying the 
dynamic multi-state Markov (MSM) model to the regime transitions of 166 countries from 1980 
to 1999. The findings suggest that the bipolar view is valid only in the long run and for a reason 
quite different from what the proponents had imagined, namely, economic development rather 
than crisis-driven exits. The estimated steady-state probabilities even predict that a unipolar fixed 
exchange rate system could emerge in the long run. Despite some divergence, both de jure and 
de facto regime data corroborate the key findings.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“…….contingent policy rules to hit explicit exchange rate targets will no longer be 
viable in the twenty-first century……[Countries]….will be forced to choose 
between floating exchange rates on the one hand and monetary unification on the 
other.”  Eichengreen (1994), pp. 4-5.  
 
The bipolar view, which became popular in the 1990s, considers all exchange rate regimes other 
than completely fixed and freely floating as unsustainable1. Advocates of the bipolar view argue 
that greater exposure to global capital markets makes intermediate exchange rate regimes such as 
adjustable peg, crawling peg and crawling band susceptible to speculative attacks. Countries will 
be forced to move to the corners, either to a fixed regime such as currency union, currency board 
or dollarization, or to a freely floating regime (Eichengreen, 1994; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; 
Summers, 2000). The bipolar view is also consistent with the impossible trinity doctrine.  This 
doctrine states that a country must give up one of the three goals: exchange rate stability, 
monetary independence and financial market integration, that is, a country cannot have all three 
simultaneously.   
The proponents of the bipolar view claim that an intermediate regime will be hollowed out 
over time as a result of involuntary transitions, particularly for a crisis2. The view was rapidly 
adopted by the financial establishments as the “new conventional wisdom” (Frankel, 2003) after 
the Asian crisis in 1997-98 with a view to “reform financial architecture” so as to minimize the 
frequency and severity of crises in the future. As a result, as Eichengreen (1994) anticipated, the 
distribution of currency regimes will take a bipolar form in the 21st century. This paper, 
therefore, aims to examine the validity of the claim in a thorough empirical investigation. 
                                                 
1 This view is variously called, “the corners hypothesis”, “the two poles view”, “hollowing out hypothesis” and “the vanishing 
middle”. 
2 As in the currency crisis models, an abandonment of an intermediate regime (pegs) happens when countries with intermediate 
regime experience excessive domestic credit growth, overvalued exchange rates, or weak economic growth and high 
unemployment. 
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Do crises lead to the disappearance of the intermediate regime? Even though the 
proponents of the bipolar view argue that crises produce an irreversible transition toward the 
poles, various case studies show that transitions occur not just away from an intermediate 
regime, but also toward it. Some transitions are hastily executed and some are highly deliberated, 
with or without the occurrence of crises. For example, a number of Asian countries adopted 
floating regimes during the time of crisis in 1997-98, but they reverted to a de facto intermediate 
regime after the crisis. Thailand and Korea are notable examples (Hernandez and Montiel, 2003). 
On the other hand, the currency union was adopted voluntarily by European countries in 1999 
with preceding preparations done in steps, such as the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the 
European Monetary System, and its predecessor, the Snake.  
Therefore, both voluntary and involuntary transitions can happen toward the poles, which 
seem contradictory with the claim of the proponents of the bipolar view. It is therefore asked in 
this paper, is the bipolar view likely to be valid for crises, as mentioned by the proponents, or 
could it be valid for different reasons?  To answer this question, the dynamics of currency regime 
transitions of 166 countries are studied for the period 1980-99 using both de jure and de facto 
data3.  
The paper examines whether the distribution of exchange rate regimes tends to converge to 
the polar extremes and identify factors that increase the likelihood of convergence. To this end, 
combined with transition intensities involving determinants of regime transitions under the 
multi-state Markov (MSM) model, this paper sets a testable approach as follows. If the rates of 
transition from intermediate regimes to the poles are higher than the rates of reverse transition, 
and if capital integration and currency crises facilitate transition, it would suggest that the 
bipolar view is likely to be valid. Although this approach points to a weaker definition of the 
                                                 
3 Not all countries’ regimes are available for all dates. 
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bipolar view as it allows some transitions toward the intermediate regime, it is helpful in 
exploring a broader scope of the view.  
Two recent studies provide evidence against the bipolar view.  Masson (2001) is the first 
study which cast a light on the hollowing out hypothesis directly and showed that there are non-
zero transition probabilities to intermediate regimes, implying that the bipolar view is not correct 
strictly.  However, it did not study the causes.  In another study, Masson and Ruge-Murcia 
(2005) endogenize the exchange rate regime transitions to show that inflation and, to a lesser 
extent, output growth and trade openness can explain regime transitions, but not necessarily 
toward the bipolar direction.  
Although significant contributions, it is not clear from these studies whether the view may 
gain some validity from a long run perspective and for the reasons mentioned by its proponents, 
the main one being crises. Our analysis departs from the above studies in two important ways. 
First, while the strict definition of the view (i.e. no transition toward intermediate regime) is not 
supported by data (Masson, 2001), this study proposes an alternative test involving a weaker 
definition of the view by allowing some transitions toward the intermediate regime. The 
proposed approach has made it possible to explore a broader scope of the view instead of its 
narrow scope under the strict rule. Second, and more importantly, this study tests the view by 
analyzing the effects of crisis and developmental stage directly on the regime transition 
dynamics, which was not done in earlier studies. 
The primary antecedents of choosing explanatory variables, “crisis” and “developmental 
stage” are found in the literature of involuntary and voluntary regime choice models, such as the 
currency crisis models and optimum currency area (OCA) models, respectively (see Masson and 
Ruge-Murcia, 2005; Poirson, 2001). Developmental stage dummy is chosen to capture various 
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dynamics of development as well as to proxy capital integration since capital control dummy is 
not found significant to regime transitions. Moreover, when relatively more developed countries 
face crisis in an intermediate regime in the face of high capital mobility, they are likely to move 
to the corner and sustain it as long as they have more developed financial institutions (Hossain, 
2009a). But this may not be the case for relatively less developed countries because they often 
revert to an intermediate regime from the corner after the crisis as they cannot comply with the 
conditions required to sustain a corner regime. These dynamics have been investigated in this 
paper, and within that context, it is found that the bipolar view is likely to be valid during later 
stages of development.  
To analyze the dynamics of regime transition with the effects of relevant explanatory 
variables as a part of testing the hollowing out hypothesis, this study chooses to apply the multi-
state Markov (MSM) model (see Appendix II for details). Particularly, this model has been 
chosen for some of its special features. First, as a statistical methodology, the MSM model has 
been widely used in the biomedical sciences to analyze transition between different states of 
diseases and death (an absorbing state) and it can predict the probability of death with the effect 
of a disease through estimating survival (or hazard) probabilities4. The MSM model is well 
suited since testing the hollowing out hypothesis requires an analysis of whether a polar extreme 
becomes an absorbing state over time with transition from the intermediate regime. Second, a 
continuous-time model is used because the duration of individual regime is a continuous time 
variable, which provides estimates of transition intensities (the instantaneous rate of transition) 
between exchange rate regimes as a non-linear function of the relevant explanatory variables 
assuming that transition happens instantaneously. This is a useful assumption required for testing 
the bipolar view as transition between currency regimes generally happens instantaneously with 
                                                 
4 For details, see Kay (1986), Islam (1994), Marshall and Jones (1995). 
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the effect of crisis or for other reasons. Finally, the model can even be used to predict the 
expected time for hollowing out of intermediate regimes allowing for the effects of possible 
explicit causes. These features of this model make it an adequate framework for testing the 
hollowing out hypothesis5.  
Moreover, the hidden Markov model (HMM), an extension of the MSM model with 
misclassification, is introduced to increase the precision of the test of the bipolar view by 
considering probabilities of misclassification of regimes, as we observe a substantial amount of 
discrepancies between de jure and de facto regime classifications (as shown in Section 2).  
To summarize the main results, this study finds that economic development significantly 
increases the likelihood of transition from an intermediate regime to a fixed or a floating regime, 
but crises do not. The analysis shows that less developed countries move from an intermediate 
regime in the face of crisis but most of them revert to an intermediate regime due to crisis in 
corner regimes, particularly in a floating regime. This rejects the claim that crises produce an 
irreversible transition toward the poles. However, crisis can be a factor of short-term regime 
dynamics, and hence, it cannot be an imperative to hollowing out of intermediate regime in the 
long run.  
What would be the long run distribution of currency regimes? This is the question that is 
asked in the title of the paper. Since the current distribution of currency regimes may change in 
the future in the face of capital mobility or changing status of development, we estimate steady-
state probabilities under the MSM to have an idea about the long run distribution of regimes. We 
                                                 
5
 The MSM differs from the Markov chain models used in earlier studies such as Masson (2001) and Masson and Ruge-Murcia 
(2005) in terms of its properties to estimate survival (hazard) probabilities. The estimation of survival probabilities of 
intermediate regimes is crucial for this study as it is necessary to estimate the expected time of hollowing out of intermediate 
regime for explicit causes.   
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find from the estimates that there is high probability for relatively developed countries to adopt a 
fixed regime in the long run. 
The remainder of the article is divided into six sections. Section 2 discusses a number of 
technical issues related to testing the bipolar view, such as the divergence between de jure and de 
facto classifications and a snapshot of regime transitions over time. The empirical framework 
and results of the study are discussed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. The application of the 
Hidden Markov Model to deal with the problem of regime misclassification and the prediction of 
hollowing out of intermediate regimes are presented in the next two sections (Sections 5 and 6). 
Section 7 concludes this paper. 
2. Examining the bipolar view: related issues 
 
Explaining the choice of a regime appears to be difficult in the beginning since the 
classification of a regime is problematic. Note that the IMF has traditionally offered a 
classification which is “de jure”, that is, it is essentially based on what the countries report to the 
IMF. As a result, it does not reflect the actual regime when countries diverge from their officially 
announced regime for certain periods of time. This divergence potentially affects the analysis of 
historical trends in exchange rate regimes. However, based on the available de facto 
classification data sets, Hossain (2009b) analyzes divergence as a stochastic process of learning 
to a de jure regime, and argues that it would not affect the long-run distribution of exchange rate 
regimes.   
To ensure the robustness of the empirical investigation of the bipolar view, this section 
provides a discussion on discrepancies between de jure and de facto regime classifications in the 
following subsection. 
2.1  Divergence from de jure exchange rate regimes 
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In this section, the proportion of divergence is estimated between de jure and two de facto 
regime classifications proposed by Bubula and Ötker Robe, (2002) (henceforth BOR de facto 
classification) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) (henceforth RR)6. If the de jure and de facto 
regimes do not match for a specific year, it is considered divergent and the percentage of 
divergent cases is calculated with respect to the total number of observations.  
Divergences are estimated within three broad categories of exchange rate regimes namely, 
fixed, intermediate and floating. A fixed regime consists of hard pegs such as formal 
dollarization, currency union and currency board arrangement; an intermediate regime consists 
of all soft pegs such as conventional fixed pegs (basket pegs with published or secret weights, 
single currency peg), crawling pegs, crawling bands and tightly managed floats; and a floating 
regime consists of managed floats without a predetermined range and free floats 7 . As the 
definition of de jure fixed regime is different from the above-mentioned one (because de jure 
fixed regime consists of conventional fixed regimes in addition to hard fixes)8, the percentage of 
divergence from de jure fixed to other de facto regimes is not estimated. Hence the focus is 
primarily on the divergence between intermediate and floating regimes. 
The estimated percentages of divergence are reported in Table 1 (Panel A) for the BOR 
classification (for the period 1990-99) and in Table 1 (Panel B) for the RR classification (for the 
periods 1980-89 and 1990-99). According to BOR, around 12 percent of de jure floaters in fact 
operated intermediate regimes. But, according to the RR classification, this percentage is around 
40 percent for the 1980s and 50 percent for the 1990s. This divergence has increased over time, 
                                                 
6 Some other notable de facto classifications are, Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (1997); Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002); 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001).  De jure classifications are published by the IMF. 
7 Note that the ‘freely falling’ category of the RR classification is lumped, in most cases, into the freely floating category, and 
sometimes it is placed under managed floating on the basis of other information gathered by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
8 Until 1999, countries were obliged to report their exchange rate regime to the IMF according to three categories: fixed (both 
hard fixes and conventional pegs), limited flexible regimes (other soft pegs) and freely floating. From 1999, the IMF asks 
countries to report their exchange rate regimes according to eight categories to overcome the limitations of old coarse 
classification system. 
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perhaps due to high exchange rate volatility, crises and episodes of high inflation. On the other 
hand, the percentage of de jure intermediate that was floating in practice has decreased in the 
1990s (using BOR, 26 percent in the 1980s and 18 percent in the 1990s; and 14 percent 
according to RR). These are perhaps the cases of inadvertent floating in the face of political or 
financial crises. From the trend in both types of divergence, it may be argued that the fear of 
floating has increased over time.  
Another type of divergence, one that is particularly relevant to measurement error, is that 
among de facto classification schemes. The estimated proportion of the observed differences 
between de facto regimes is shown in Table 2. A total of 17 percent diverged cases are detected 
where a majority of these are associated with intermediate and floating regimes. To understand 
this divergence (or measurement error in de facto classification), we have studied the case of 
Malawi’s exchange rate regime classification. Malawi’s exchange rate regime was classified in 
1990 as a de jure peg, intermediate by BOR, and floating by the RR classification. In fact, 
Malawi’s official exchange rate was fixed to a basket of undisclosed currencies, which falls in 
the intermediate regime category (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004). It appears that the RR 
classification, relying on statistical tests, identifies the ‘nontransparent multiple currency basket’ 
as floating (or managed floating) because of frequent parity adjustments. However, it can be 
classified as a basket (i.e. intermediate regime) if the researcher uses other information as in the 
case of BOR. A basket peg is classified as fixed in de jure classification according to the IMF’s 
old coarse classification system (until 1999). 
It is therefore necessary to recognize the possibility that the proportion of divergence is 
slightly overestimated due to misclassification in de facto regime classifications. To deal with the 
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probability of misclassification in de facto classification systems, this study introduces the 
Hidden Markov model in Section 5.  
To conclude, the findings in this section show that the divergence between de jure and de 
facto regime classifications and among the de facto classifications is not negligible. Thus, the de 
jure and two de facto classifications are used in the analysis for robustness of the results. 
 
 
2.2 The bipolar view: A preliminary investigation 
This subsection investigates the validity of the bipolar view in a snapshot. The percentages 
of alternative exchange rate regimes adopted by countries in 1980, 1990 and 1999 are shown in 
Figure 1. According to the de facto classifications, the percentage of countries in intermediate 
regimes remained almost the same in 1980 and in 1990, but it had declined in 1999. This finding 
is consistent with Fischer (2001)9. However, the de jure classification shows that the percentage 
of countries in intermediate regimes has slightly increased over time.  
Next, the percentage distribution of regimes between 1990 and 1999 according to the 
stages of development (developing, emerging and developed) is examined in Figure 2. This is to 
examine the implication of the stages of development on the choice of regimes. The definitions 
of developed and emerging countries follow those of the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) index and Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) of J.P. Morgan (see Table A1 in 
Appendix I). The rest are then defined as developing countries. Figure 2 shows that the 
percentage of countries operating intermediate regimes is slowly declining over time irrespective 
of the stage of development. Only the de jure trend shows that the popularity of intermediate 
regimes among developing countries is not declining.  
                                                 
9 Fischer (2001) observes that economies open to international capital flows have been and are in the process of moving away 
from intermediate regime, some towards harder pegs, more towards systems with greater exchange rate flexibility. 
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In summary, the snapshot analysis shows that intermediate regimes have been gradually 
hollowing out from the 1980s, but more rapidly in the 1990s. The stage of development appears 
somewhat irrelevant for the bipolar choice of regimes. However, it is not possible to understand 
clearly the dynamics of regime transition from the snapshot or any static analysis. Because, 
within the period covered, some countries shifted toward corner regimes while some shifted from 
the corner regimes to intermediate regimes. The snapshot analysis ignores this short-to-medium 
term dynamics and also causes of transitions are not known from the analysis. Therefore, it is 
necessary to analyze the dynamics of regime transition to have a clear idea about the bipolar 
view. The subsequent sections of this paper will, therefore, deal with dynamic models of 
exchange rate regime transitions. 
3. Empirical framework 
In this section, the basic analytical framework is discussed. The empirical framework for 
testing the bipolar view is based on the multi-state Markov model (the model is discussed in 
Appendix II). A diagram for displaying the transitions (λij) among the regimes, fixed (1), 
intermediate (2) and floating (3) with the coefficients of covariates (βij) is shown in Figure 3. 
This figure shows that transitions can take place from fixed to intermediate (λ12), fixed to 
floating (λ13), intermediate to fixed (λ21), intermediate to floating (λ23), floating to fixed (λ31) and 
floating to intermediate (λ32) regimes. The model is analyzed under this framework because no 
absorbing state is found in the currency regime transition pattern for the period under 
consideration. 
To identify the factors that may facilitate transitions toward the bipolar direction, variables 
suggested by the competing paradigms of regime choice can be considered as explanatory 
variables. The focus of this study is primarily on the variables that are suggested by the 
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proponents of the bipolar view. These proponents argue that capital integration will make 
intermediate regimes susceptible to speculative attacks and countries will therefore be forced to 
adopt a corner regime. Hence, according to them, capital integration and crises are the potential 
reasons for transition toward the bipolar direction. Since capital integration is not found 
significant in this study (see Table 3), developmental stage is considered, because emerging and 
developed economies have stronger links to global capital markets than developing economies. 
Moreover, stages of development could be deemed as an important factor for regime transition as 
macroeconomic fundamentals and financial sectors may behave differently in different stages of 
development for different currency regimes. This study also investigates the effects of some 
economic fundamentals on transitions. 
With the effect of the aforementioned variables, the bipolar view is likely to be valid if the 
rate of transition from intermediate to fixed (λ21) is significantly higher than the rate of reverse 
transition (λ12), i.e. if λ21/λ12 > 1 and if the rate of transition from intermediate to float (λ23) is 
significantly higher than the rate of reverse transition (λ32), i.e. if i.e. if λ23/λ32 > 1. Support for 
either of the condition by data would imply a partial support to the bipolar view for the period 
under consideration. 
4. Empirical results 
The regime transition dynamics are analyzed by calculating the duration of an individual 
regime in years from the 1980s and 1990s10. The dependent variable is regime classification, 
which consists of fixed = 1, intermediate = 2 and floating = 3. A larger value of the dependent 
variable indicates that a more flexible regime is likely to be adopted for the country in the period 
under consideration.  
                                                 
10 The duration of a regime is calculated by how many years (it is in most cases fractional value) a country continued with a 
specific currency regime. This gives rise to a continuous time MSM model.  
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Note that the transition between regimes can happen either voluntarily or involuntarily. 
For example, generally speaking, if transition happens as a result of economic development or 
capital mobility, it may be viewed as voluntary. On the other hand, if transition happens in a 
crisis, it may be viewed as involuntary.  So the multi-state Markov model of exchange rate 
regime transitions involves explanatory variables representing both voluntary and involuntary 
elements.  
The dynamics of regime transitions are explored in two stages. First, following the 
traditional approach, the effects of some macroeconomic fundamentals implied by the OCA and 
currency crisis models are assessed on the transitions. Generally, OCA models explain voluntary 
transitions while crisis models explain involuntary transitions. From the OCA perspective, 
literature suggests that while trade openness, the existence of a dominant trading partner, labor 
mobility and nominal flexibility explain a move toward a fixed regime, economic development, 
diversification of production and exports, and size of the economy explain a move toward a 
floating exchange rate regime (Poirson, 2001; Von Hagen and Zhou, 2005). On the other hand, 
as an involuntary choice model, the currency crisis models suggest a large number of 
endogenous variables such as inflation rate, growth rate of GDP, unemployment rate, fiscal 
deficit, level of reserves, growth of domestic credit etc. as the determinants of exchange rate 
regime choice. Although there is no consensus on the positive relationship between these 
macroeconomic fundamentals and the regime choice in existing literature (see Baxter and 
Stockman, 1989; Juhn and Mauro, 2002), this analysis is revived under the MSM model in order 
to shed additional insights into the choice of a polar regime. Second, transition intensities are 
estimated allowing for the effects of the stage of development (developing  =  1, emerging  = 2,  
developed =  3)  and the role of currency crises (crisis  = 1, no crisis = 0).  
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The crisis dummy is taken from Glick and Hutchison (2001) and other macroeconomic 
fundamentals such as terms of trade, openness, inflation, broad money growth and per capita 
GDP growth are taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
4.1  The effect of macroeconomic fundamentals on transitions 
First we examine the transition dynamics considering explanatory variables suggested by 
OCA and crises literature. We consider only four variables, such as trade openness, inflation, per 
capita GDP and capital control (1 = control, 0 = open) as explanatory variables and do not 
consider other potential variables suggested by literature in order to avoid collinearity problem in 
the model. The estimates of parameters are reported in Table 3 for the 1990s.  
Table 3 shows that trade openness and high inflation increase the probability of a flexible 
regime. This finding is consistent with many studies including Masson and Ruge-Murcia (2005). 
However, per capita GDP growth, a proxy for economic development, is not found to be 
significant to explain regime transitions. Traditionally, per capita GDP growth is used as a proxy 
of economic development, which is a rough indicator of economic development. The coefficient 
on capital control dummy is not significant on regime transition, indicating that the argument of 
the proponents of the bipolar view that capital integration may lead countries to abandon the 
intermediate regime is not supported by data. Therefore, rather than these macroeconomic 
fundamentals, exogenous structural features of an economy, such as developmental stage and 
crisis are used to explain regime transition dynamics in the following sub-section. 
 
4.2  Regime transition dynamics 
The dynamics of currency regime transition towards fixed and floating corner is examined 
by estimating the transition intensity rates λˆ 21, λˆ 12, λˆ 23 and λˆ 32 in Panel A of Tables 4 and 5 
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with the effect of developmental stage and crisis. Panel B of the tables 4 and 5 gives estimates of 
the coefficients of explanatory variables on regime transitions. The results are reported in Table 
4 for the 1980s and in Table 5 for the 1990s. 
Table 5 (panel A) shows that the rate of transition from intermediate to fixed regime, λˆ 21, 
is statistically significant and higher than the rate of reverse transition, λˆ 1211. Therefore, the 
“fixed corner” is satisfied in the 1990s (the insignificance of λˆ 12 for de facto data implies that 
very few transitions occurred from hard fixes to intermediate regimes, but λˆ 12  is significant in 
de jure data because some conventional pegs, which are classified as fixed in de jure 
classification, gave way to intermediate regimes). But, in the 1980s, as Table 4 shows, only de 
jure data satisfy the fixed corner. On the other hand, the estimated rate of transition from 
intermediate to floating regime is lower than the rate of reverse transition, λˆ 23 < λˆ 32, implying 
that the “floating corner” is not satisfied by data in both the 1980s and 1990s. Both estimates, 
λˆ 23 and λˆ 32, are statistically significant, indicating that intermediate regimes are less likely to 
give way to floating regimes. These estimates also indicate that there are some transitions toward 
the intermediate regime from the polar extreme, which is not consistent with the predictions of 
the proponents of the bipolar view. 
Now consider the coefficients of the explanatory variables (βij) on regime transitions from 
intermediate to fixed regime.  The coefficient of developmental stage is negative and significant 
(according to de jure data, Table 4) in the 1980s while it is positive and significant in the 1990s 
on the transition from intermediate to fixed regime  (all three data sets corroborate this, see Table 
5). This implies that although less developed countries were involved with such transitions in the 
                                                 
11 The rates of transition between fixed and intermediate regime are almost the same in BOR de facto classification. 
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1980s, the situation has changed in the 1990s as more developed countries adopted fixed 
regimes. Some examples of this trend are the creation of the European Monetary Union in 1999 
as well as the adoption of currency boards in Argentina (1991) and Bulgaria (1997). On the other 
hand, the effect of crises is not significant on the observed transition from intermediate to fixed 
regime during the 1980s. But in the 1990s, crisis has positive and significant effects on both 
transitions and reverse transitions (both de jure and RR classification data satisfy this finding), 
indicating that crisis does not only produce transition toward a polar extreme. Therefore, the 
estimates of base-line transition intensities and the coefficients of explanatory variables together 
indicate that crisis may not be an important factor for the hollowing out of intermediate regime; 
rather it can be considered a factor of short-term regime transition dynamics. 
Next, considering the transition from intermediate to floating regimes, the effect of 
developmental stage ( 23βˆ ) is mixed in the 1990s as it is positive and significant according to the 
RR classification, positive and insignificant according to BOR, and negative and significant 
according to de jure classification. The opposite sign for βˆ 23 in de jure and RR de facto 
classification indicates a discrepancy which means that certain less developed countries which 
officially claim to be floaters are, in fact, not. However, the positive and significant effect of 
developmental stage on the transition from intermediate to floating regime via the RR 
classification suggests that relatively advanced countries tend to adopt floating regimes. But the 
role of crisis on the transition from intermediate to floating regime is not strong as the 
coefficients are only marginally significant. These evidences suggest that there is high likelihood 
for hollowing out of intermediate regimes with the rise of the level of economic development 
over time.  
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Finally, considering the transition from floating to intermediate regime, the coefficient of 
the stage of development is negative and statistically significant (according to both BOR and de 
jure data), suggesting that less developed countries (indicated by negative sign of the coefficient, 
βˆ 32) were involved in such transition. Although the effect of crisis is insignificant on the 
transition in the 1980s, a robust positive and significant effect (all three data set corroborate this) 
of crisis in the 1990s implies that floating exchange rate regime is not a viable option for less 
developed countries as they often experience crises in it. This runs counter to the widely held 
opinion that intermediate regimes are the most susceptible to crises.  
A noteworthy finding is that less developed countries often tend to switch to a more rigid 
regime at the advent of a crisis, implying that crisis cannot be an imperative toward hollowing 
out of intermediate regimes. This finding is also contrary to the predictions of the so-called first 
generation model (Krugman, 1979) and second generation model (Obstfeld, 1996) of currency 
crises 12 . Perhaps, the countries’ tendency to adopt a fixed regime at the time of crisis is 
associated with the state of vulnerability of their financial sectors.  
It should also be noted that despite a considerable amount of divergence among regime 
classifications (as shown in Section 2), the key results do not substantially vary. This indicates 
that the divergence characterized largely by short-term regime dynamics does not matter for 
long-term regime trends. 
 
To sum up, estimates of transition intensities suggest that the “fixed corner” is satisfied, 
but the “floating corner” is not satisfied for the period under consideration, which rejects the 
bipolar view even under the weaker definition given in this study. However, by analyzing the 
                                                 
12
 In these models, crisis is usually resolved through a forced exit from the peg followed by a floating exchange rate 
regime normally characterized with exchange rate overshooting. 
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causes of transitions, it is found that the bipolar view will likely to be valid during later stages of 
development. When countries reach a high level of development, which is also correlated, inter 
alia, with high capital integration, they tend to switch to either a fixed or a floating regime and 
sustain it. Intermediate regimes remain viable for less developed countries, at least for the short 
run. The empirical findings reveal that support for the bipolar view is relatively weak in the 
1980s compared to the 1990s, indicating a decade-dependency in the regime transitions process. 
It is worth noting, however, that the 1990s was marked by higher levels of economic 
development as many countries entered into the emerging category, increased capital market 
integration and global shocks that make intermediate regimes unsustainable to some extent. If 
this pattern continues, the validity of the bipolar view will be more pronounced in the foreseeable 
future.  
5.  Regime misclassification 
In this section the Hidden Markov model is applied to the de facto regime classification 
data sets to obtain estimates of transition intensities controlling for the probability of 
misclassification. In the Hidden Markov model, the true regimes (or states) of the Markov chain 
are not observed. The observed regimes are governed by some probability distribution (the 
emission distribution) conditional on the unobserved regimes. For example, the observed states 
Oi are generated conditionally on the true states Si according to a misclassification matrix E = 
(ers)n×n, where ers = Pr (O(t) = s | S(t) = r), and is assumed to be independent of t
13. 
                                     
To investigate the effect of explanatory variables z(t) for the probability of 
misclassification ers for each pair of states r and s, a logistic model can be used, 
                      Log (ers /(1- ers)) =  γ
T
rs z(t).                                                                                                                            
                                                 
13 The quality of a diagnostic test (sensitivity and specificity) is often measured by probabilities that the true and observed states 
are equal, Pr (Oi (t) = r | Si (t) = r). 
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Here a direct method is applied to calculate likelihoods in continuous time based on matrix 
products, following the method developed by Macdonald and Zucchini (1997) and Guttorp 
(1995).  
The estimated misclassification probabilities are reported in Table 6. The sample period 
considered for the HMM is 1990-99. The estimates in Table 6 show that the probability for 
misclassifying a floating regime as an intermediate regime and vice-versa is around 0.04, which 
is slightly higher than the probability of misclassifying the other regime.  
The estimated transition intensities and coefficients of covariates are reported in Table 7. 
The estimates from both BOR and RR classification show that the rate of transition from 
intermediate to fixed regime is higher than the rate of reverse transition. On the other hand, the 
rates of transition and reverse transition between intermediate and floating regimes are almost 
the same. These results are robust as both de facto classifications provide almost the same results 
(after correcting for the probability of misclassification in it). 
Turning to the effects of developmental stage and crisis on transitions, the effects of higher 
levels of development (indicated by the positive sign of the coefficient of developmental stage) 
and currency crisis are significant to the transition from intermediate to floating regime. 
Nonetheless, crisis has significant effect also on the transitions from floating to intermediate 
regime, and intermediate to fixed regime. This suggests that the effect of crisis is not very strong 
for the reinforcement of the bipolar view. This set of findings confirms the commonly held belief 
that less developed countries may find it advantageous to operate intermediate regimes while the 
floating regime is better suited for more developed nations.  Considering transition intensities 
and the effect of developmental stage, it may be concluded the bipolar view is likely to be valid 
in the long run. 
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The findings in this section using the HMM support the findings of the previous section 
strongly. 
6. Predictions for hollowing out 
Since the probabilities of adopting regimes may change over time as a result of various 
events, such as capital mobility or crises in the future, current distribution of regimes may not be 
the same as the long run one. Therefore, we ask: what would be the long run distribution of 
exchange rate regimes? This section explores answer of this question by estimating the long-run 
probability distribution (also known as invariant or steady-state distribution) of regimes under 
the MSM. The estimates are reported in Table 8. 
Table 8 (Panels A and B) shows that intermediate regimes will not be hollowing out 
completely with or without crisis situation in the long run. However, according to de facto data, 
the long run probability of adopting an intermediate regime is found to be very low among 
emerging and developed countries. Even there is a high probability of hollowing out of floating 
regime with the emergence of a unipolar fixed exchange rate regime in later stages of 
development.  
The estimated steady-state probabilities are found to be low for both intermediate and 
floating regimes, indicating that an intermediate regime is not viable for relatively advanced 
countries. This is because intermediate regime does not bring much benefits such as anti-
inflationary or safe-guards against liability dollarization. Therefore, the findings in this section 
are supportive of the bipolar view in the long run under a weaker definition given in the 
Introduction section, and of the unipolar fixed system, in general. 
7. Conclusion 
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This study examines the bipolar view of currency regime choice in the context of crisis 
and developmental stage. While the strict definition of the view (i.e. no transition toward 
intermediate regime) is not supported by data, this study proposes an alternative test involving a 
looser definition of the view by allowing some transitions toward the intermediate regime. The 
proposed approach has made it possible to explore a broader scope of the view. 
This study finds that economic development significantly increases the likelihood of 
transition from an intermediate regime to a fixed or a floating regime, but crises do not. The 
analysis shows that less developed countries move from an intermediate regime in the face of 
crisis but most of them revert to an intermediate regime due to crises in corner regimes, 
particularly in a floating regime. This rejects the claim of the proponents that the bipolar view 
will be valid in the long run with irreversible transitions toward the poles for a crisis in 
intermediate regimes. However, our findings suggest that the bipolar view is valid only in the 
long run under a weaker definition and for a reason quite different from what the proponents 
imagined, namely, economic development rather than crisis-driven exits. 
The findings of this study suggest that an irreversible transition toward the poles occurs 
both voluntarily and involuntarily when countries have achieved economic development and 
integrated with global capital markets. The MSM model prediction shows that intermediate 
regimes disappear more rapidly in the emerging and developed stages than the developing stage. 
This finding is reasonable because when institutions are built and a good policy track is 
established in the emerging and developed stages, an intermediate regime may not be suitable as 
the economy will no longer require the benefits of an intermediate regime like anti-inflationary 
credibility or safeguards against liability dollarization.  
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The estimates of long-run probabilities suggest that a unipolar fixed exchange rate system 
might emerge in the long run as there is a high probability for adopting fixed regime among 
relatively developed countries. This prediction comes from recent trends of countries adopting 
currency union, currency boards and dollarization.  
It is thus reasonable to argue that the looser definition that is taken in this study does not 
contradict much with the spirit of the original view. Hence, if we take a nuanced view of the way 
policies tend to work, a looser definition of the bipolar view might be appropriate. 
The MSM model used in this study could not give an estimate of survivorship function of 
intermediate regime due to the absence of an absorbing polar extreme in the data for the period 
under consideration. Therefore, we could not predict the estimated time of hollowing out of 
intermediate regime. However, the MSM model can be effectively applied if an absorbing 
regime emerges over time, and more importantly, the model can be applied to many other similar 
situations of economic analysis.    
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Table 1 
Divergence between de jure and de facto exchange rate regime classifications 
 
A.  De jure vs. BOR de facto (1990-1999) 
Divergence 
from\to 
De facto Total 
observations 
De jure   Fixed                      Intermediate                        Float  
Intermediate 1 336 77 414 
(0.20%) (81.20%) (18.60%) (100%) 
Float 1 109 315 425 
 (0.20%) (12.09%) (74.10%) (100%) 
 
 
B.  De jure vs. RR de facto (1980-1989, 1990-99) 
Divergence 
from\to 
                                      De facto Total 
observations 
De jure          Fixed                     Intermediate                Float  
 
Intermediate 
 
Float 
1980-89 1990-99 1980-89 1990-99 1980-89 1990-99 1980-89 1990-99 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(0.50%) 
219 
(73.74%) 
327 
(85.20%) 
78 
(26.26%) 
55 
(14.30%) 
297 
(100%) 
384 
(100%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(0.30%) 
52 
(40.31%) 
182 
(50.30%) 
77 
(59.69) 
174 
(48.10%) 
129 
(100%) 
357 
(100%) 
Notes: 1. Estimates are based on total number of observations. Row percentages are reported. 
2. Underline indicates consensus (consistent) regime. 
 
Table 2 
Observed difference between BOR and RR de facto classification (1990-1999) 
 RR  de facto  
BOR de 
facto 
Fixed               Intermediate                 Float Total 
observations 
Fixed 225 4 2 231 
 (97.40%) (1.70%) (0.90%) (100%) 
Intermediate 2 646 66 714 
 (0.30%) (90.50%) 9.20% (100%) 
Float 4 154 187 345 
 (1.10%) (44.0%) (53.40%) (100%) 
Total 
observations 
231 804 255 1290 
Note: Row percentages are calculated. Total diverged cases are (off diagonal cases): 232 (17% of total cases). 
Underline indicates consensus (consistent) regime 
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Table 3 
Estimated coefficients of macroeconomic fundamentals on regime transition in 1990-99 
A. De jure classification  
 De jure classification BOR de facto classification RR de facto classification 
Transition 
parameters 
Trade 
openness 
Per 
capita 
GDP 
growth 
Inflation  Capital 
control 
Trade 
openness 
Per 
capita 
GDP 
growth 
Inflation  Capital 
control 
Trade 
openne
ss 
Per 
capita 
GDP 
growth 
Inflation  
 
Capital 
control 
Fixed to inter.  -0.48 (0.51) -0.82 
(2.91) 
1.82 
(1.09) 
0.27 
(0.71) 
-0.40 
(0.51) 
-0.30 
(2.98) 
-1.07 
(3.40) 
-0.18 
(1.52) 
-0.72 
(0.55)* 
-0.54 
(2.98) 
0.19 
(1.81) 
-0.05 
(1.4) 
Fixed to float  -1.62 
(0.60)* 
0.18 
(1.96) 
1.86 
(0.89)* 
0.53 
(0.72) 
-1.08 
(0.55)* 
-0.30 
(2.56) 
0.77 
(1.40) 
-0.20 
(1.47) 
-1.27 
(0.56)* 
1.34 
(0.88)* 
1.70 
(0.96)* 
-0.06 
(0.8) 
Inter. to fixed  0.10 (0.54) -0.89 
(8.3) 
0.20 
(4.03) 
0.04 
(0.80) 
0.15 
(0.33) 
-0.97 
(6.2) 
-0.59 
(2.09) 
-0.11 
(0.98) 
0.0004 
(0.37) 
-1.60 
(6.48) 
-0.72 
(1.88) 
0.01 
(0.62) 
Inter. to float  -1.77 
(0.85)* 
0.70 
(6.01) 
0.97 
(1.33) 
0.52 
(0.51) 
-1.21 
(0.99)* 
-0.76 
(6.21) 
0.61 
(1.34) 
0.66 
(0.38)* 
-0.94 
(0.62)* 
-0.57 
(6.11) 
-0.10 
(1.39) 
0.30 
(0.77) 
Float to fixed  -0.002 
(1.09) 
-0.75 
(6.1) 
0.55 
(5.05) 
-0.06 
(1.18) 
0.17 
(0.99) 
-1.22 
(5.7) 
2.13 
(1.81) 
0.15 
(1.38) 
0.34 
(0.82) 
-2.84 
(4.84) 
0.64 
(1.83) 
0.03 
(1.33) 
Float to inter.  -0.03 (0.49) -2.65 
(2.47) 
0.24 
(1.16) 
0.39 
(0.38) 
-0.08 
(0.43) 
0.14 
(2.45) 
0.66 
(0.75) 
0.42 
(0.38) 
0.17 
(0.42) 
1.67 
(2.67) 
-0.22 
(0.99) 
0.06 
(0.59) 
Notes: Log-likelihoods: RR: -232.70; BOR: -363.77; De jure: -446.17 
-Standard errors are in parentheses; ***,**,* indicates significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
A. Estimated rates of transition intensities, 1980-89 
Transition intensities 
 
 
RR de facto  
(N = 1103) 
De jure 
(N = 1091) 
Fixed to inter. (λ12) 0.04 (0.015)*** 0.03 (0.01)*** 
Fixed to float  (λ13) 0.01 (0.012) 0.01 (0.006) 
Inter. to fixed  (λ21) 0.003 (0.005) 0.04 (0.02)** 
Inter. to float (λ23) 0.04 (0.005)*** 0.05 (0.015)*** 
Float to fixed (λ31) 0.001 (0.010) 0.01 (0.02) 
Float to inter. (λ32) 0.05 (0.021)* 0.08 (0.03)*** 
 
 
B. Estimated coefficients of developmental stage and crisis on transition intensities 
 Developmental stage Currency crisis 
De jure RR de facto De jure RR de facto 
Fixed to inter. (β12) -0.30 (0.46) -0.26 (0.98) -0.91 (1.18) 2.33 (1.05)** 
Fixed to float (β13) 0.58 (0.43) 0.71 (1.37) 1.48 (0.74)** -0.06 (5.15) 
Inter. to fixed (β21) -1.52 (0.54)** 0.51 (0.85) -0.004 (0.77) 0.114 (2.42) 
Inter. to float (β23) -0.34 (0.44) -0.07 (0.27) 0.13 (0.89) 1.13 (0.47)*** 
Float to fixed (β31) 0.73 (1.38) 0.18 (2.3) -0.95  (2.91) 1.55 (3.53) 
Float to inter. (β32) -0.89 (0.50)* -0.16 (0.42) -0.14  (1.03) -0.08 (0.81) 
Log-likelihood De jure:   -240.91; RR de facto: -173.57 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***,**,* indicates significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
A. Estimated rates of transition intensities, 1990-99 
Transition intensities De jure 
(N= 1573) 
      BOR de facto 
(N=1616) 
RR de facto 
(N= 1282) 
Fixed to inter. (λ12) 0.028(0.008)*** 0.017 (.012) 0.017 (0.016) 
Fixed to float  (λ13) 0.041 (0.009)*** 0.016 (.011) 0.03(0.016)*** 
Inter. to fixed  (λ21) 0.058 (0.015)*** 0.013 (0.004)*** 0.026 (.007)** 
Inter. to  float (λ23) 0.084 (0.017)*** 0.09 (0.011)*** 0.033 (0.007)*** 
Float to fixed (λ31) 0.02 (0.008)*** 0.006 (0.007) 0.03 (0.013)*** 
Float to inter. (λ32) 0.11 (0.019)*** 0.125 (0.022)*** 0.08 (0.026)*** 
 
 
B. Estimated coefficients of developmental stage and crisis on transition intensities, 1990-99 
 Developmental stage Currency crisis 
De jure BOR de facto RR de facto De jure BOR de facto RR de facto 
Fixed to inter. (β12) 1.15 (0.38)*** -0.38 (1.33) 2.02 (0.73)*** 1.85 (0.84)** -0.24 (3.62) 3.77 (1.45)** 
Fixed to float (β13) 0.33 (0.40) -0.60 (1.51) 0.41 (0.59) 1.43 (0.72)** 0.37 (2.68) 3.37 (0.77)*** 
Inter. to fixed (β21) 0.61 (0.25)** 1.12 (0.31)*** 1.06 (0.29)*** 1.11 (0.66)* 0.15 (1.04) 1.54 (0.92)* 
Inter. to float (β23) -0.67 (0.32)** 0.02 (0.17) 0.55 (0.24)** 1.33 (0.66)* -0.21 (0.57) 0.78 (.60) 
Float to fixed (β31) 0.36 (0.42) 0.34 (0.71) -0.01 (0.45) 0.45 (1.05) 1.05 (1.52) 0.19 (1.72) 
Float to inter. (β32) -0.32 (0.22)+ -0.53 (0.23)** -0.20 (0.29) 0.59 (0.019)*** 0.70 (0.36)** 1.14 (0.53)** 
Log-likelihood De jure:   -506.49;  BOR de facto: -490.52; RR de facto: -286.31 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively.  Significance is tested by the Wald Test 
Statistic Z = )ˆ.(E.S/ˆ ββ  
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Table 6  
Estimated probabilities of errors in de facto classification of regimes, 1990-99 
 Classification probabilities 
                                                                                            Observed regime 
BOR de facto classification Fixed Intermediat
e 
Float 
 
      True  
regime 
Fixed 0.99 (0.17) 0.00 (0.26) 0.003(0.14) 
Intermediat
e 
0.03 (0.005) 0.93 (0.01) 0.04 (0.006) 
Float 0.01 (0.003) 0.03 (0.01) 0.96 (0.02) 
RR de facto classification 
 
    True   
regime 
Fixed 0.99 (0.25) 00 (0.25) 0.01 (0.25) 
Intermediat
e 
0.04 (0.01) 0.92 (0.01) 0.04 (0.005) 
Float 0.01 (0.001) 0.04 (0.01) 0.96 (0.025) 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
Table 7 
A. The estimates of transition intensities using the hidden Markov model, 1990-99 
Estimated transition 
intensities   
BOR de facto RR de facto 
Fixed to inter. (λ12)     0.03 (0.03)              0.03 (3.50) 
Fixed to float  (λ13) 0.06 (0.02)***   0.09 (0.01)*** 
Inter. to fixed  (λ21) 0.05 (0.00)*** 0.06 (0.0)*** 
Inter. to float (λ23) 0.10 (0.01)*** 0.08 (0.0)*** 
Float to fixed (λ31) 0.04 (0.00)*** 0.06 (0.0)*** 
Float to inter. (λ32) 0.10 (0.01)*** 0.13 (0.0)*** 
B. Coefficients of developmental stage and currency crisis on transition intensities, 1990-99 
 Developmental stage Currency crisis 
 BOR de facto RR de facto BOR de facto RR de facto 
Fixed to Inter. (β12) -3.42 (290.68) 0.63 (20.74) -1.58 (235.56) 1.50 (81.99) 
Fixed to float (β13) 0.65 (5.55) 0.24 (3.84) 2.46 (11.38) -5.09 (255.96) 
Inter. to fixed (β21) -0.28 (0.38) -0.32 (0.31) 1.99 (0.43)*** 0.99 (0.49)** 
Inter. to float (β23) 0.35 (0.22) * 0.71 
(0.22)*** 
1.89 (0.38)*** 0.66 (0.60) 
Float to fixed (β31) 0.56 (0.537) 1.47 (1.59) 1.72 (0.96)* 3.41 (2.58) 
Float to inter. (β32) -0.20 (0.397) -0.05 (0.39) 2.22 (0.67)*** 1.93 (0.67)*** 
Log-likelihood BOR de facto: -839.96  
RR de facto: -646.48 
***,**,* indicates significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 8 
Steady-state probability distribution of exchange rate regimes  
A. Without crisis 
 BOR De facto data RR De facto data 
 Fixed 
 
Intermediate 
 
Float 
 
Fixed 
 
Intermediate 
 
Float 
 
Developing 0.13 0.52 0.36 0.33 0.57 0.10 
Emerging 0.30 0.34 0.36 0.60 0.28 0.12 
Developed 0.52 0.18 0.30 0.81 0.09 0.10 
 
B. With crisis 
 BOR De facto data RR De facto data 
 Fixed 
 
Intermediate 
 
Float 
 
Fixed 
 
Intermediate 
 
Float 
 
Developing 0.25 0.58  0.17  0.49 0.19 0.32 
Emerging 0.52  0.33  0.15 0.81 0.09 0.10 
Developed 0.76  0.14  0.10  0.95 0.02 0.02 
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FIGURE 1 
 Percentage distribution of countries adopted alternative regimes in 1980, 1990 and 1999 
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FIGURE 2 
 Percentage distribution of countries adopted alternative regime in 1990 and 1999 according to 
their developmental stage. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 
 Transitions within the regimes of the MSM model 
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                         APPENDIX I 
Table A1  
List of emerging and developed countries 
 
Emerging Countries (31) Developed Countries (22) 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Qatar, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, South 
Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
United States. 
Note: This list is based on the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index and Emerging Markets Bond 
Index Plus (EMBI+) of J.P. Morgan 
 
 
APPENDIX II 
The multi-state Markov model 
The multi-state Markov model (MSM) is used in this paper to analyze the exchange rate 
regime transition dynamics. Note that as the underlying economic structure such as parameters 
and variance change over time, the nature of the optimal exchange rate regime is expected to 
vary correspondingly, leading to an evolution of exchange rate regime. Therefore, the new 
equilibrium position of the economy leads to an evolution of an exchange rate regime. This can 
be true in a crisis situation when some countries change their regime and again return to the 
previous regime after the crisis. This gives rise to a Markov model, which assumes that the 
probability of transition to an alternative regime depends only on the current regime irrespective 
of past history. Masson (2001) argues that although the Markov assumption appears to be 
somewhat restrictive, as a first approximation, it would seem to be an adequate framework for 
examining exchange rate regime transitions as “it supposes that a typical currency will face the 
same likelihood that some shock will push it to an alternative regime” (p. 573). 
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The multi-state Markov model assumes continuous time Markov chain and explicitly takes 
the duration of a regime into account. The model is specified as 
(1)              ( ) Zijij ijez|t
βλπ = , (i, j = 1, 2, 3)                                                                
where λij represents baseline parameters (transition intensities), Z denotes the vector of 
explanatory variables and βij denotes the coefficients of explanatory variables on the transition 
from regime i to j. The transition intensities, λij, can be defined as 
(2)          
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t
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λ .                     
Both time-dependent and time-invariant parameters can be estimated by the model. The 
estimated parameters are obtained from the partial likelihood function and that the estimates are 
less likely to suffer from omitted variable bias and multicollinearity. The Newton-Raphson 
iterative optimization algorithm can be used for non-linear estimation of the coefficients. Since 
this model assumes a continuous time Markov chain, it provides estimates of transition 
intensities (instantaneous rate of transition). Using the Kolmogorov forward differential equation 
(Eq. 3), transition probabilities can be estimated from transition intensities.  
The MSM model considers that countries often make transitions and reverse transitions 
among three exchange regimes― fixed (1), intermediate (2) and floating (3), either voluntarily 
or involuntarily. It is assumed that there is no absorbing state (a state of no return) in the 
exchange rate regime transition process. The transition intensity matrix is defined as, 
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The elements of the matrix Γ , λij’s are defined in (2). Assume that the transition intensities 
i.e. instantaneous rate of transition are independent of time and the intensities follow the 
property ∑
≠
−=
ji
ijii λλ ; i, j = 1, 2, 3, that is, row sum is zero. 
The relationship between the transition probability matrix P(t) and the transition intensity 
matrix Γ can be established with the Kolmogorov forward differential equation 
(3)                                                     ΓP(t)
t
P(t)
=
∂
∂
,                                                  
where the (i,j)th element of the matrix P(t), pij (i,j = 1, 2, 3) represents the probability of 
transition from state i to j  in a time interval t. Thus the transition probability matrix P(t) can 
be expressed as 
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The Likelihood function 
A general method for evaluating the likelihood for a multi-state Markov model in 
continuous time, applicable to any form of transition is discussed here (for details, see 
Kalbfleisch and Lawless, 1985; Kay, 1986). The likelihood is calculated from the transition 
probability matrix P(t). The likelihood function is the product of all individual contributions and 
the total contribution of an individual country to the likelihood function is the result of the 
product of the contribution from each observed transition. 
For a country k, the likelihood function is formulated as: 
(4)  
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where θ = (λ, β), λ = (λij) and  β= (βij) for i, j = 1, 2, 3. The variable sij takes the value 1 if 
transition occurs and 0 if otherwise.  For example, if at time t, a country is in state 1 (fixed 
regime), at time t+1, the country can be in either of the states 1 (fixed), 2 (intermediate) or 3 
(float). Therefore, s11+ s12 + s13 = 1, and so on. The log-likelihood function can be calculated by 
taking the log of the likelihood function. 
The maximum likelihood estimates of θ = (λ,β) can be obtained by maximizing the log 
likelihood, and applying any of the iterative procedures such as the quasi-Newton algorithm or 
Nelder-Mead simplex-based algorithm. The MSM model is estimated in this paper using the 
“msm” package of R software. 
 
 
 
